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REGULATING THE "GIFT OF LIFE"-THE 1987
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
Abstract: Demand for human transplant organs exceeds the supply.
The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides a model for state laws
intended to alleviate this shortage. This Comment analyzes these pro-
posed laws in light of their potential impact on, first, the organ shortage
and, second, the legal rights of donors and their families. Enactment of
the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act can increase organ donation in
Washington while intruding minimally on family and physician control
of the donation process.
Organ transplants are treatment for a growing number of diseases.
As medical science rapidly increases the success of transplantation,
demand for organs is likewise increasing.2 As a result, a significant
shortage of transplant organs exists.' An estimated 21,000 people in
the United States are on transplant waiting lists.' In Washington
State, a patient might wait six months for a cornea5 or several years
for a kidney.6 A person in need of a heart might not survive that
wait.7
In 1987, responding to continued concern about the organ short-
age, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) s drafted a new Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
1. In addition to transplantation of hearts, livers and kidneys, there is increasing success with
heart-lung, pancreas, and bone marrow transplants. G. CERILLI, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
AND REPLACEMENT 10-11 (1988). Transplantation of multiple abdominal organs also has been
performed as treatment for cancer. Seattle Times, Feb. 11, 1989, at A2, col. 1.
2. McDonald, The National Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; 259 J. A.M.A.
725 (1988). Rapid advances in immunology are improving the results of transplantation,
providing the means to overcome the body's rejection of a transplanted organ. Once rejection
can be consistently prevented, the medical applicability of transplantation will be unlimited. G.
CERILL,, supra note 1, at 29.
3. Schwindt & Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 483, 484 (1986). Statistical studies present various estimates of
organ demand. However, these studies uniformly reveal that demand exceeds supply. Id.
4. National Kidney Foundation, KIDNEY '89, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 5.
5. Interview with Donna Oiland, Director of the Lions Eye Bank, in Seattle, Wa. (Mar. 21,
1989) (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
6. Interview with Karyn Keen-Denton, Manager of the Northwest Organ Procurement
Agency, in Seattle, Wa. (Mar. 23, 1989) (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
7. Each year an estimated 15,000 people who might benefit from heart replacement die.
Evans & Yagi, Social and Medical Considerations Affecting Selection of Transplant Recipients, in
HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 27-28 (1987).
8. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was
organized in 1892 to promote uniformity of state law. The NCCUSL is composed of members
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(UAGA).9 The Act is a model for revising state laws on organ dona-
tion and will be presented for adoption in Washington State. If
adopted, it would modify existing Washington law by prohibiting
commercial transactions in cadaveric organs. " It also would simplify
and clarify the authorization to retrieve organs11 and require medical
and emergency personnel to routinely identify potential donors.1 2
This Comment's discussion of the 1987 UAGA's proposed changes
focuses on two issues: one, whether the provisions will effectively
increase the supply of transplant organs, and two, whether the provi-
sions impermissibly alter legally recognized rights of parties in the
organ donation process. State prohibition of commercial transactions
in organs will foreclose options to increase organ supply as it limits
individual rights to sell body parts. Nevertheless, the benefits of an
exclusively altruistic system of organ recovery warrant foregoing this
potential source and limiting individual rights to sell organs. The
1987 UAGA provisions that simplify and clarify authorization to
retrieve organs and require routine hospital inquiry about donation
should increase organ retrieval. Reducing traditional family and phy-
sician control of the donation process aids in realizing the potential
increase. The state's interest in promoting organ retrieval justifies this
restriction of family rights and physician prerogative.
I. EXISTING ORGAN RETRIEVAL LAW
A. The State Law Foundation
State laws comprise the majority of laws controlling organ donation.
The efforts of the NCCUSL, which promulgated the first UAGA in
1968, led to relative uniformity from state to state.1 3 By 1973, all
states had adopted the main provisions of the UAGA.14
from all states. It drafts models for state law, which members then introduce to their respective
state legislatures. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 564 (1973).
9. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1988).
10. Id. § 10; see infra notes 50-53, 79-83 and accompanying text. Cadaveric organs are
organs retrieved from corpses.
11. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) §§ 2, 4; see infra notes 98-100, 110-11 and
accompanying text.
12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 5; see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying
text.
13. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983) (amended 1987) [hereinafter 1968
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT]; see also Best, Transfers of Bodies and Body Parts Under the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 806 (1980).
14. 1968 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 13.
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Washington's Anatomical Gift Act follows the 1968 UAGA provi-
sions closely.15 Under Washington law, individuals may donate their
organs for transplantation after death. 16 The donor effectuates this
gift by will or other witnessed document.17  The Washington state
driver's license can act as an organ donor document.18 In the absence
of contrary intent by the decedent, the statute designates a prioritized
list of survivors authorized to consent to donation. Good faith com-
pliance with the law provides immunity from civil or criminal
liability.20
In 1987, the Washington Anatomical Gift Act was amended.21
Washington's statute now requires hospitals to establish procedures to
identify potential organ donors.22 Two additional state statutes, not
part of the Anatomical Gift Act, also address organ retrieval for trans-
plantation. A medical examiner, with jurisdiction over a body, may
donate either corneas or the pituitary gland from the body.23
There are no reported Washington cases by which to interpret either
the Washington Anatomical Gift Act or the medical examiner stat-
utes. Similar statutes in other jurisdictions have been upheld,24
although there are few reported challenges. This lack of litigation
leaves unanswered many questions about the scope of existing law.25
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 68.50.340-.510 (1989).
16. Id. § 68.50.350(1).
17. Id. § 68.50.370. The gift is effective when the testator dies, without waiting for probate.
Delivery of the gift document during the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the gift valid.
Id.
18. Id. §§ 46.20.113, 68.50.370.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.350 (1989). Authorized survivors are prioritized as follows:
spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, legal guardian, any other person authorized to dispose
of the body. Id.
20. Id § 68.50.400.
21. An Act Relating to Anatomical Donations, ch. 129, 1986 Wash. Laws 431 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 68.50.500-.510 (1989)).
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 68.50.500 (1989); see also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying
text.
1 23. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.106 (1989) (pituitary glands may be removed and utilized); id.
§ 68.50.280 (corneal tissue for transplantation).
24. Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986) (statute authorizing medical examiners to
remove corneal tissue without notifying decedent's next-of-kin held constitutional), cerL denied,
481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985)
(statute authorizing corneal removal upheld), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986); Nicoletta v.
Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, 136 Misc. 2d 1065, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1987) (good faith
compliance with UAGA provides immunity to hospital and eye bank retrieving eyes); Williams
v. Hoffman, 66 Wis. 2d 145, 223 N.W.2d 844 (1974) (UAGA's affirmative "good faith" defense
upheld against next-of-kin complaint of mutilation of a corpse).
25. The full authority of organ retrieval laws may not be generally exercised by hospitals and
physicians, who avoid retrieving organs under circumstances that might give rise to litigation.
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Public policy underlying existing organ donor law thus provides the
most useful criteria for judging proposed changes.
Although the legislative history of Washington's Anatomical Gift
Act reveals no explicitly stated purpose, the 1968 UAGA was the
model for the Washington Act.2 6 Furthermore, Washington law must
be construed to achieve uniformity with other state laws enacting the
UAGA.27 Thus, there is strong support for assuming that the policies
underlying Washington law parallel those stated in the 1968 UAGA:
encouragement of organ donation and respect for socially and cultur-
ally established rights of those affected by the organ retrieval
process.2 8
B. Congress Responds to the Organ Shortage Crisis
State enactment of the 1968 UAGA did not decrease the organ defi-
cit. Two events in the early 1980's prompted congressional attention
to the problem. One was a series of public appeals by desperate fami-
lies seeking organs and financial assistance for transplants.2 9 The
other was the appearance of a commercial market for transplant
organs.3° Congress responded with the National Organ Transplant
Act of 1984." The National Organ Transplant Act addressed the
need to research issues underlying transplantation and to support
existing non-governmental efforts to reduce the current organ
Lee & Kissner, Organ Donation and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 100 SURGERY 867, 868-71
(1986); see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.410 (1989).
28. 1968 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 13. The preface to the 1968 UAGA
states:
Wherever adopted . . . [the 1968 UAGA] will encourage the making of anatomical gifts,
thus facilitating therapy involving such procedures. When generally adopted, . . .
uncertainty as to the applicable law will be eliminated and all parties will be protected. At
the same time the Act will serve the needs of the several conflicting interests in a manner
consistent with prevailing customs and desires in this country respecting dignified
disposition of dead bodies.
Id.
29. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 3975, 3977. President Reagan publicized the plight of a young child needing a
liver transplant in one of his radio broadcasts. Id.
30. In 1983, Dr. H. B. Jacobs established International Kidney Exchange Ltd., a Virginia
corporation, to broker inter vivos sales of kidneys. A person who needed a transplant could
purchase the organ for "cost" plus the corporation's "finders fee." Dr. Jacobs anticipated
receiving some of his corporation's kidneys from willing residents of Third World countries.
Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. I.
31. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339, 2344-47 (1984)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (Supp. IV 1986)).
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shortage.32 To pursue the study of issues, Congress created a National
Task Force.33 The first Task Force report recommended creating a
national organ sharing system to support existing private organ pro-
curement agencies.34 To stop the emerging commercial market, the
Act criminalized interstate commercial transactions in organs. 35 Sub-
sequent National Task Force recommendations prompted additional
federal legislation in 1987.36 Congress amended the Social Security
Act to require hospitals participating in Medicare or Medicaid to have
written procedures to make families of potential donors aware of the
option of organ donation.37 The impact of these federal laws on the
organ supply is still being evaluated.38
C. A New Anatomical Gift Act-The 1987 UAGA
The continued severity of the organ shortage also raised questions
about the effectiveness of existing state law. In response, the
NCCUSL drafted a new UAGA in 1987. This new UAGA is a model
32. Id. at 2339; see also Cotton & Sandier, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and
Transplantation in the United States, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 57-58 (1986).
33. National Organ Transplant Act, supra note 31, at 2339. The first National Task Force
report was issued in 1985. See National Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Executive
Summary of the Report of the National Task Force on Organ Transplantation, reprinted in
HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 389, 390 (1987).
34. National Organ Transplant Act, supra note 31, at 2344. The Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network established a national system to match organs ajd recipients. Id. The
United Network of Organ Sharing, a nonprofit corporation, received the federal contract to
develop and maintain the national, computerized system. McDonald, supra note 2, at 726.
Membership in the network is mandatory for certified organ procurement agencies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-8(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
35. National Organ Transplant Act, supra note 31, at 2346-7. Federal statute provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. IV 1986).
36. Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (100 Stat.) 3607, 3669.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (Supp. IV 1986). The tie to funding sources effectively brings all
hospitals within the statute, because virtually all hospitals treat Medicare or Medicaid patients.
See generally infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (discussing laws requiring inquiry about
donation).
38. Andersen & Fox, The Impact ofRoutine Inquiry Laws on Organ Donation, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1988, at 65; see also infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
39. UNIn. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT (1987), prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 1987);
Comment, Organ Transplantation Crisis: Should the Deficit Be Eliminated Through Inter Vivos
Sales?, 17 AKRON L. REv. 283, 287-88 (1983); cf Lee & Kissner, supra note 25, at 874 (state
laws are adequate but not fully utilized).
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for state legislation aimed at increasing organ donation' through pro-
visions that prohibit sale of organs at death,41 reduce formalities of
executing the donative document, 42 prioritize donor consent over fam-
ily objection, 43 and allow medical examiners to release any useable
organ for transplantation according to procedures established by state
law. 4 The 1987 UAGA also requires hospital personnel to ask
patients about donation routinely, on or before hospital admission.45
D. State Response to the 1987 UAGA
Unlike the 1968 UAGA, which was swiftly embraced by state legis-
latures,4 6 the 1987 UAGA has met significant opposition. By July,
1989, only six states had adopted the Uniform Act.47 Debate centers
on both the authorization and consent provisions and the routine
inquiry requirement.48 Provisions prohibiting organ sale also have
been criticized.4 9 This debate raises issues the Washington legislature
must address as it considers adopting the 1987 UAGA. Analysis of
the proposed provisions and alternative solutions to the organ
shortage will aid the legislature in this task.
II. PROHIBITING SALE OF TRANSPLANT ORGANS
In the early days of transplantation in the United States, organs
were provided through an altruistic system of voluntary donation.5°
40. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), supra note 39.
41. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) § 10. Unlike federal law, the 1987 UAGA does
not attempt to govern intervivos sales. Id.; see infra notes 58-61, 96 and accompanying text.
42. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 2; see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text.
43. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1987) § 2(h); see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying
text.
44. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 4. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
45. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 5. This is in addition to such inquiry of the
family at or near the time of death. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
46. Cotton & Sandier, supra note 32, at 60. State enactment of the 1968 UAGA was the most
prompt in the experience of the NCCUSL. Id.
47. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Dakota adopted major
portions of the 1987 UAGA. Telephone interview with John McCabe, Uniform Law
Commission Legislative Director (June 6, 1989) (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
48. American Council on Transplantation, News Release (Oct. 17, 1988); see also Uniform
Law Commission, The Anatomical Gift Act Debate, UNIFORM ACTIVITIES, Fall 1988, at 6-7.
49. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
50. Kidneys were the first organs successfully transplanted in significant numbers of patients.
The first kidney transplants involved organs from living donors, primarily family members.
Caplan, Sounding Board: Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver Organs for
Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 272, 273 (1987). The gift relationship,
logically assumed in the family context, was incorporated into the first organ donor law, the 1968
UAGA. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. Today, however, less than one third of
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However, the shortage of organs for transplantation, and the life-or-
death circumstances of many awaiting transplant, creates opportunity
for financial profit. 1 Faced with an emerging organ market, several
states enacted legislation prohibiting sale.52 Congress also responded
with legislation criminalizing interstate commercial transactions in
transplant organs. 5 3
A. Organs As a Commercial Commodity
State and federal prohibitions against organ sales are criticized for
intruding upon individual property rights. 4 Many biotechnology
products are derived from human tissue. 5 These products are
increasingly profitable. 6 A broad ban on sale arguably deprives an
individual of property rights in valuable body parts. 57
Unlike some state laws, however, federal law and the 1987 UAGA
address only organs for "transplantation or therapy."5 " Arguably,
these prohibitions would not apply to the sale of organs for use in
product development.5 9  Further, the 1987 UAGA addresses only
market transactions designed to occur after death.' This narrow pro-
hibition avoids the more difficult questions of inter vivos sale of non-
essential organs or renewable tissue.61
kidney transplants in the United States involve living related donors. Bay & Hebert, The Living
Donor in Kidney Transplantation, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND REPLACEMENT 273 (G.
Cerilli ed. 1988).
51. See supra note 30 (describing a proposed international kidney market). The Northwest
Organ Procurement Agency reports receiving inquiries from parties interested in selling organs.
Interview with Karyn Keen-Denton, supra note 6.
52. Comment, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. Rv. 1015, 1026-1029
(1985).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra note 35.
54. Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rlv. 207 (1986).
55. Id. at 210-4ll.
56. A California plaintiff was held to have a cause of action in conversion against a
pharmaceutical corporation which used portions of the patient's therapeutically removed spleen
to develop a marketable cell-line allegedly valued at over three billion dollars. Moore v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, review granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816,
763 P.2d 479 (1988).
57. Comment, supra note 54, at 214-223.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra note 35.
59. A market for human organs in product development might draw from the pool of
transplant organ donors, thus decreasing the number of transplant organs. Comment, supra note
54, at 236-37. This possibility supports banning all organ sale as a necessary means of preserving
donation for transplantation. Id.
60. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) § 10.
61. Kidneys are examples of non-essential organs. Each person has two kidneys, but one
healthy kidney can assume the function normally performed by two. S. JACOB, C. FRANCONE &
177
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Aside from constitutional questions of property rights, these stat-
utes may foreclose too hastily an avenue for alleviating the organ
shortage. Financial incentives are powerful motivators. Remunera-
tion for organs should not be summarily dismissed as an option to
increase organ supply.6' Compensation could take many forms,
including payment of the decedent's hospital bills or giving family
members priority should any of them need an organ.63 An altruistic
system of uncompensated donors has not supplied enough organs.
Other factors must underly lawmakers' persistence in maintaining this
system.
B. Benefits of Giving Organs: The Altruistic Motive
Proponents of an altruistic system of organ recovery identify social
benefits of the process of donation. Organ donation affirms socially
valued human interactions. 6' The donor's experience in enhancing or
saving another's life brings the social community together. In con-
trast, opportunity for financial gain may create family conflict over
disposition of organs. If organs are items of monetary value to the
next of kin, a person might either feel unduly coerced to sell, or fear
that the next of kin would not request all life-saving efforts.65 One also
can criticize the unfairness of a market system of organ allocation.
Access to life-saving resources should not be restricted by individual
financial ability to purchase organs.66 The social benefits of voluntary
donation, therefore, extend beyond the mere number of retrieved
organs.
C. Coexistence of Market and Altruistic Systems?
Commercial and altruistic systems of organ retrieval need not be
mutually exclusive. Although adherents to the domino theory of eco-
nomics assume that once something is a salable commodity, the mar-
ket will dominate, 67 both market and non-market interactions in some
W. Lossow, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN MAN 525 (5th ed. 1982). Examples of renewable
tissue are blood, sperm, and ova.
62. Comment, supra note 39, at 302.
63. Dukeminier, Supplying Organs For Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 848 (1970).
64. R. TITMUSS, THE GiFr RELATIONSHIP 71-75 (1972).
65. Dukeminier, supra note 63, at 865.
66. Eliminating unfairness in organ allocation will not ensure equal access to transplantation.
Some transplant centers refuse patients who do not have the resources to pay for the surgery.
Caplan, Obtaining and Allocating Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 5, 6 (1987).
67. M. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1913-14 (1987).
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commodities coexist.6" This coexistence, and the problems that result,
is illustrated by the system for procuring human blood. Both sellers
and donors contribute to the blood supply;69 yet, acute shortages of
blood continue to occur. 70 Moreover, use of paid donors may compro-
mise the quality of the blood supply. 71 Commentators assert that
blood from paid donors is more likely to be contaminated than blood
from voluntary donors.72 Thus, paying blood donors does not ensure
an adequate supply but potentially undermines the quality of that
supply.
Obtaining transplant organs presents many of the same quality and
supply issues as obtaining blood. Lessons learned from blood procure-
ment can be applied to organ recovery. The social benefits and
increased quality control of a purely altruistic system support exclud-
ing paid donors.
A publicly operated transplant organ market is one proposed com-
promise, incorporating the benefits of financial incentives with those of
the current altruistic system.73 Under such a plan, the government
could contract for the future delivery of organs upon the death of a
seller. Various forms of compensation are possible, including non-
monetary forms such as tax deductions,74 preferential access to organs
for the donor's family, or discounts on medical insurance.75 Public
control of the market allows regulation of organ quality as well as fair
allocation to potential organ recipients.76 Of course, sellers will want
a fair price. In setting prices, the system must predict future demand
and the probability of delivery of a useable organ. Administrative
costs of such a program may be prohibitive, especially when compared
68. Id. at 1915.
69. R. TrrMuss, supra note 64, at 96; Comment, Liability for Transfusion-Transmitted
Disease, 14 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 141, 144 (1988).
70. R. TrrMuss, supra note 64, at 64-67.
71. Id. at 142-148.
72. Studies from the 1960's showed the risk of a recipient contracting hepatitis from a blood
transfusion was higher when commercially supplied, rather than donated, blood was transfused.
Id. AIDS, like hepatitis, can be transmitted through blood transfusions. Comment, supra note
69, at 142. Although screening tests for these diseases are now available, their effectiveness is
limited. Id. at 150. Thus, some commentators argue that using blood from paid donors increases
the risk of transmission of these viruses. Id. at 145.
73. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 3, at 483.
74. Comment, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 857
(1973).
75. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 3, at 495-96. Payment could be made to the donor's
choice of charity, thus reinforcing the altruistic nature of the transaction. Id.
76. See supra notes 66, 71-72 and accompanying text.
179
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to the current system which is primarily private.77 Congressional pol-
icy, as expressed in the National Organ Transplant Act, does not
advocate such increased public expenditures.
However theoretically persuasive the arguments for an organ mar-
ket might be, federal law currently prohibits commercial transactions.
The altruistic system prevails on a national level. The 1987 UAGA
supports this social policy and would reinforce it through state law.
D. Organ Sale in Washington
Washington law defines eligible donees of transplant organs. These
include hospitals, other entities which employ a physician full-time,
and any specified individual needing therapy or transplantation. 7' The
statute does not prohibit a donee from reimbursing the donor's estate
or family. 79 However, using paid blood or organ donors is discour-
aged under Washington law.S Statute provides limited immunity
from implied warranties and civil liabilities to suppliers obtaining
blood or organs from voluntary donors. Organs from compensated
donors are specifically excluded from the statute's immunity."'
Even without state prohibition of organ sale, market options may
not exist. Federal law controls most of the internal organs retrieved in
Washington through the national organ procurement network. 2 Even
purely local organ transactions, outside the auspices of the national
network, may be held to affect interstate commerce. 3 The broad
reach of the federal statute may sufficiently prohibit a commercial
market. However, Washington can reinforce the effect of the federal
ban by adopting the 1987 UAGA provision. 4
77. See supra note 34 (discussing the private corporation operating the national network).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.360(l)(d) (1989).
79. Although the statute consistently uses the word gift in reference to body parts, arguably
the authority to give does not preclude sale, as both concepts assume property rights in the body
part. Indeed, one court held that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act created property rights in
the body not previously recognized under common law. In re Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.54.120 (1989).
81. Id.
82. Certified organ procurement agencies coordinate organ retrieval and allocation in
Washington State. These agencies are members of the United Network of Organ Sharing and
share organs nationally through a computerized system. Interview with Karyn Keen-Denton,
supra note 6. Therefore, these organs are in interstate commerce and controlled by the federal
statute prohibiting sale or purchase. See supra note 35.
83. Congressional power to control activities that affect interstate commerce allows
prohibition of activities occuring exclusively within one state, if those activities might
cumulatively affect interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (federal
control of farmer's grain production extends to wheat grown for home consumption).
84. Washington's statutory definition of part differs from that of the 1987 UAGA by
including artificial organs, such as pacemakers, as parts governed by its Anatomical Gift Act.
Vol. 65:171, 1990
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Academic arguments for a commercial organ market are unlikely to
change public aversion to the idea of selling body parts to persons in
desperate need. The present altruistic system offers social benefits that
outweigh the speculative increase in organ supply promised by adding
financial incentives. Consistent with this sentiment, Washington
should adopt the 1987 UAGA provision banning sale.
III. AUTHORIZATION & CONSENT TO ORGAN
RETRIEVAL
An individual's attitude toward organ donation may differ from that
of family members. Washington law states that survivors may not
authorize organ retrieval if the decedent was known to object."5 The
law is silent, however, as to the family's veto power over a valid donor
document. The 1987 UAGA explicitly prioritizes donor consent over
family wishes.86 Proponents of this provision assert the potential
increase in donations justifies alteration of rights traditionally afforded
decedents' families.
A. Controlling Disposition of Bodies
Under common law, a decedent held no "property" right support-
ing testamentary disposition of his or her body.87 Laws such as the
1968 UAGA arguably created a limited property right by allowing for
donation after death.88 In contrast, the rights of the decedent's family
historically have been acknowledged.89 These rights relate only to
burial, creating liability for interfering with dead bodies.9" Modem
courts developed the concept of a "quasi-property right" to character-
ize the interest of relatives in the bodies of their next of kin.91
WASH. REv. CODE § 68.50.340(5) (1989). The legislature should consider whether sale of
artificial organs should be distinguished from sale of "natural" body parts. Although recycling
of pacemakers is not accepted medical practice due to risk of infection, European trade in these
devices has been reported. R. SCOTT, THE BODY As PROPERTY 180 (1981).
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.350(2) (189).
86. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) § 2(h).
87. Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659, 665 (1882), noted in Matthews, Whose Body? People
As Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 191, 210 (1983).
88. In re Moyer, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977). "One who intentionally, recklessly or
negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents
its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased
who is entitled to the disposition of the body." IH.
90. Id.
91. Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1084 (1986).
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Washington courts have recognized this right.92 As a legal concept,
these "quasi-property rights" are criticized. 93 However, their judicial
recognition reinforces the social norm of respecting family wishes.
However one characterizes the rights of the decedent or family,
Washington, like other states, subordinates these rights to state inter-
ests such as detecting crime or protecting public health. Washington
law allows the coroner or medical examiner to perform an autopsy
when death is from violent or suspicious causes.9 4 State law also
places limitations on how and where bodies may be buried.95
Although there are no reported challenges to Washington's statutes,
courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly upheld similar statutes.96
The 1987 UAGA provisions are no more intrusive on traditional fam-
ily rights than existing state law controlling the disposition of bodies.
B. Donor Versus Family Consent
Washington's Anatomical Gift Act recognizes rights of both the
decedent and family to donate the decedent's body after death. 97 The
changes proposed by the 1987 UAGA to existing Washington law
include: one, eliminating the witnessing requirement for the donative
document;98 two, specifying that donor consent overrides family objec-
tion to donation;99 and three, allowing medical examiners to release
any useable organ for transplantation according to state law proce-
dures.1" The provision for medical examiners is unlikely to affect
organ retrieval in Washington.' Therefore, the primary effect of the
92. Guilliume v. McCulloch, 173 Wash. 694, 24 P.2d 93 (1933); Herzl Congregation v.
Robinson, 142 Wash. 469, 253 P. 654 (1927).
93. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
"It seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of thin air to meet the
occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a
fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer." Id.
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.010 (1989) (establishing coroner's jurisdiction over remains).
95. Id. § 68.50.130 (making unlawful disposal of remains a misdemeanor); id. § 68.50.135
(permitting burial on island solely owned by individual).
96. Dukeminier, supra note 63, at 832.
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.350 (1989); see also supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text.
98. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) § 2(b).
99. Id. § 2(h).
100. Id. § 4.
101. Corneas and pituitary glands are already retrievable under Washington law. WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 68.50.106, .280 (1989). Vascularized organs, such as hearts, livers and kidneys,
deteriorate rapidly after cessation of the heartbeat. If not removed and cooled within sixty
minutes, they are unsuitable for transplantation. Callender, Legal and Ethical Issues
Surrounding Transplantation: The Transplant Team Perspective, in HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 42 (1987).
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1987 UAGA provisions would be to strengthen donor control and
provide the family less power to object.
1. Witnessing Donor Documents
A majority of the population approves of organ donation, yet few
individuals complete organ donor cards.102 Washington law requires
an organ donor document to be "signed by the donor in the presence
of two witnesses who must sign the document in his presence."10 3 If
the formality of this procedure were removed, it would be easier to
complete a donor card. The number of valid card-carrying donors
might increase.
Surveys of attitudes toward organ donation do not identify the wit-
nessing formality as a barrier to completion of donor cards.' 4 Psy-
chological factors more plausibly explain this hesitancy.105 Many
individuals find it difficult to confront the reality of death.10 6 More
specifically, people fear that indicating willingness to donate organs
may compromise efforts to save their lives.107 Further, personal reli-
gious beliefs may be obstacles to donation.' °8 However, for the person
without psychological resistance, a simple procedure for completing
donor cards will increase the likelihood he or she will validly complete
the document. The 1987 UAGA provision appropriately addresses
that category of potential donor.
2. Family Consent to Organ Retrieval
Donor documents may not play a significant role in the retrieval
process. When a donor document is completed, the 1968 UAGA and
similar state statutes delineate clearly that the document is valid
authorization; yet, only four states routinely salvage organs without
family consent, despite valid organ donor documentation.'0 9 The
102. A Gallup Poll reported that almost 75% of persons surveyed approved of organ
donation, yet only 17% had completed donor cards. Task Force on Organ Transplantation,
Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations (1986), quoted in UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFr ACT (1987), supra note 39; Parisi & Katz, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Organ Donation
and Commitment to Donate, 5 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 565, 566 (1986).
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.370(2) (1989).
104. Parisi & Katz, supra note 102, at 566-68.
105. Id.; Lee & Kissner, supra note 25, at 871.
106. Lee & Kissner, supra note 25, at 871. An analogy may be drawn to the large number of
persons who never complete wills. Dukeminier, supra note 63, at 829-30.
107. Lee & Kissner, supra note 25, at 871.
108. Id. Most religions in the United States officially sanction organ donation. However,
individual religious objections to donation are still cited. Id.
109. Overcast, Evans, Bowen, Hoe & Livak, Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ
Donors, 251 J. A.M.A. 1559, 1561 (1984) [hereinafter Overcast]. A 1983 survey revealed only
Washington Law Review
1987 UAGA proposes to clarify survivors' responsibility to follow a
donor's wishes. Family consent to donation will not be necessary if a
valid donor document is available."' Under such circumstances, the
1987 UAGA explicitly authorizes physicians and hospitals to retrieve
organs without family consent."'
Medical personnel are reluctant to retrieve organs absent family
consent.11 2 Several factors may account for this reluctance. First, the
medical community fears litigation by family members. "3 Second,
some physicians have moral objections to removing organs without
family consent." 4 Third, the transplant community anticipates nega-
tive publicity if an organ is removed over family objection. 115 Legisla-
tion addresses only the first of these reasons for physician reluctance
to retrieve organs. If the law provided stronger immunity from liabil-
ity, " 6 physicians might have more confidence in their legal authority
to retrieve. The current immunity, however, has been upheld when
challenged. "7 Social and cultural norms, rather than legal uncer-
tainty, more likely influence physician behavior. These norms rein-
force respect for family wishes." 8
Legislation such as the UAGA's provision will not immediately
alter physician behavior. Nevertheless, these provisions eliminate
ambiguity about the physician's authority relative to family consent, a
necessary first step. When combined with the simplified procedure for
completing donor cards, the 1987 UAGA's explicit authority to
retrieve can increase organ recovery.
California, Colorado, Florida, and Wyoming took full advantage of the 1968 UAGA provisions,
retrieving organs solely on the authority of a donor document. Id. at 1561-62.
110. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT (1987) § 2. The 1987 UAGA also directs medical and
emergency personnel to search for donor documents. Id. § 5.
111. Id. § 2.
112. Overcast, supra note 109, at 1561.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1561-62. The Lions Eye Bank in Seattle reports that it seeks family consent when
a potential donor is referred from the coroner. The Eye Bank prefers not to utilize the explicit
authority of Washington's cornea retrieval statute and risk offense to the public. Interview with
Donna Oiland, supra note 5.
116. Washington law provides immunity for good faith compliance with its Anatomical Gift
Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.400 (1989).
117. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing legal recognition of family
rights).
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IV. ROUTINE INQUIRY ABOUT DONATION
Although a deceased individual can effectively block donation,119
the affirmative decision to retrieve organs is controlled by two groups:
the medical professionals who identify potential donors and the fami-
lies of those donors. If legislation can affect the organ shortage, it must
be directed at these groups.
A. In creasing Family Consent
The 1987 UAGA seeks to maximize donation from families who are
willing to consent. When asked about donation, seventy-five percent
of families give permission.12 Although the number of potential
cadaveric donors each year is difficult to estimate, studies often find
that number could provide enough transplant organs to meet or
exceed the demand.12 Under that assumption, if all families of poten-
tial donors were asked, at least seventy-five percent of the organ need
could be met. A higher retrieval rate may not be feasible under the
present system requiring explicit consent to donation. One alternative
is to establish a legal presumption of consent to donate.
Several European countries have laws creating "presumed con-
sent." 2 Under this system, physicians are authorized to retrieve
organs unless there is known objection by the deceased or his or her
immediate family. 2 ' In the United States, several states have pre-
sumed consent laws for removal of corneas. 24 However, the experi-
ence of several European countries with presumed consent indicates
that physicians often continue to seek family consent before
retrieval.12 Thus, the 1987 UAGA provision mandating routine
inquiry about donation pragmatically addresses the goal of maximiz-
ing family consent.
119. WASH. REv. CODE § 68.50.350 (1989) (donation may not be authorized when decedent
indicated opposition); id § 68.50.390 (providing for donor's revocation of gift).
120. Prottas, The Structure and Effectiveness of the U.S. Organ Procurement System, 22
INQUIRY 365, 375 (1985).
121. Kolata, Organ Shortage Clouds New Transplant Era, 221 SCIENCE 32 (1983).
122. Cantaluppi, Scalamogna & Ponticelli, Legal Aspects of Organ Procurement in Different
Countries, 16 TRANSPLANT PROC. 102 (1984) [hereinafter Cantaluppi]. For example, consent to
organ donation is presumed by law in France, Israel, Finland, Italy, and Spain. Id. at 102."
123. Id
124. American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Report of the Organ
Transplant Panel, 259 J. A.M.A. 719, 720 (1988). For discussion of Washington's cornea
removal statute, see supra notes 23, 115.
125. Cantaluppi, supra note 122, at 102.
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B. Laws Requiring Inquiry About Donation
Assuming public support for organ donation, 2 6 medical profession-
als should be encouraged to identify potential donors and ask for con-
sent for retrieval. The most successful organ procurement programs
are those that effectively convince staff in intensive care units to con-
sider organ donation at every death. 12 7
In 1985, states began enacting laws to encourage hospital personnel
to inquire routinely about organ donor status. 128 By 1989, all but five
states had routine inquiry laws. 129 Federal law also mandates routine
inquiry procedures in hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid
funds. 3 ° Washington's routine inquiry statute requires more specific
procedures than federal law. 131 Hospital staff must ask the next of kin,
at or near the time of death, whether the deceased was an organ donor.
If the patient has expressed no objection, the family must be informed
of the option to donate.t32 The 1987 UAGA would add a requirement
that routine inquiry take place at or near the time of hospital admis-
sion. "' On its face, this requirement seems a minor addition to
existing law. However, the provision has been a major focus of
debate. '34
Opponents of routine inquiry at admission offer several arguments.
First, the effectiveness of inquiry of the patient at admission is doubt-
ful. A primary source of donor organs is trauma victims, not routine
hospital admissions.135 A second objection is that the public might be
126. Prottas, supra note 120, at 375.
127. Id. at 365. Success is defined according to a standard that incorporates referrals per
capita, permissions per capita, and transplanted kidneys per capita. Id. at 370-74.
128. Andersen & Fox, supra note 38, at 66.
129. Id. State routine inquiry laws vary significantly in enforcement provisions, exceptions
allowed, and whether hospitals must request donation or merely inform families of the option.
Id. at 68.
130. Under federal law, these procedures must:
(1) assure that families of potential organ donors are made aware of the option of organ or
tissue donation and their option to decline,
(2) encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances, views, and beliefs
of such families, and
(3) require that an organ procurement agency ... be notified of potential donors;
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.500 (1989).
132. Id.
133. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1987) § 5.
134. Uniform Law Commission, supra note 48, at 6-7. Groups taking exception to the
provision include the Eye Bank Association of America and the United Network for Organ
Sharing. Id.
135. Id. at 6. The drafters of the 1987 UAGA recognized trauma victims as potential donors
and would require emergency medical personnel to search for donor cards. UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT (1987) § 5, supra note 9.
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offended by the donation question, resulting in a backfire of resist-
ance.136 Physicians may be concerned that such a question would
undermine the patient's confidence in the doctor, needlessly amplify-
ing fear of surgery or treatment. Unless routine inquiry laws increase
donation, these potential problems are not justified.
Routine inquiry statutes were enacted only recently and state provi-
sions vary, making evaluation of their effectiveness difficult.1 37 How-
ever, one study observed a national consensus that presumptions about
the feelings of survivors should not thwart the opportunity to donate
organs.1 38 Proponents of the 1987 UAGA routine inquiry provision
agree. They do not foresee public opposition to being asked about
donation.1 39 The donation question is like many of the other routine
and arguably invasive questions already posed to the patient at hospi-
tal admission."4 Although patient refusal will foreclose the option of
organ retrieval under existing law,'4 1 evidence suggests the majority of
persons asked will consent.' 42
Routine inquiry procedures can assist medical personnel in the diffi-
cult task of retrieving organs. Requesting donation from a grieving
family is emotionally demanding and time consuming. 143 Rewards are
rarely direct.'" Even health care professionals who -support organ
donation may wish to avoid this situation.' 45  Their task would be
made easier with prior documentation of a patient's willingness to
donate. Washington should expand its routine inquiry statute to
136. Uniform Law Commission, supra note 48, at 6-7.
137. Anderson & Fox, supra note 38, at 77. Initial studies of these laws are inconclusive. In
1986, the year following enactment of its required request law, New York reported heart
donation increased by 94%, livers by 96%, and kidneys by 23%. In contrast, during a similar
time frame with similar state laws, Oregon and California reported an initial increase in donor
referrals, followed by a later decline. Id. at 75.
138. Id. at 77.
139. J. McCabe, Editorial, UNIFORM ACTIvITIEs, Fall 1988, at 7.
140. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIr ACr (1987) § 5 comment.
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.350 (1989) (survivors may not authorize retrieval if the
decedent was known to object).
142. Parisi & Katz, supra note 102, at 566.
143. Prottas & Batten, Health Professionals and Hospital Administrators in Organ
Procurement. Attitudes, Reservations, and Their Resolutions, 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 642, 644
(1988).
144. The medical staff who retrieve an organ are unlikely to see the benefits to the transplant
recipient, who may be in another state. See supra note 34 (discussing the network for organ
sharing). Organ procurement agencies maintain strict confidentiality as to the identity of
transplant recipients. Interview with Karyn Keen-Denton, supra note 6.
145. Prottas & Batten, supra note 143, at 645.
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incorporate the 1987 UAGA provision for inquiry at hospital admis-
sion. Objections to the provision assume a public resistance that has
not been documented.
V. CONCLUSION
Human organs are increasingly valuable commodities. As such,
they are subject to competing claims of the individual, the family, and
the potential transplant recipient. The task of mediating among these
interests falls on legislatures. The 1987 UAGA offers a viable model
for states faced with this challenge.
Washington should adopt the provision prohibiting commerce in
transplant organs. State law will then reinforce federal law, reaffirm-
ing the value of altruism. Limiting the option to sell organs intrudes
minimally on individual rights. Public policy supports the conclusion
that this commodity should not carry a price tag.
The provisions designed to facilitate organ donation enhance indi-
vidual opportunity to donate, while reducing family opportunity to
object. These laws should be adopted to increase the number of val-
idly documented donors and increase physician confidence in the
authority of donor documents. Family consent may remain pivotal in
the decision to retrieve organs, due more to traditional cultural atti-
tudes than legal rights of the family. However, cultural changes can
occur more easily when the law is clear. The 1987 UAGA provides
that clarity.
Expanding routine inquiry directly confronts larger numbers of per-
sons with the question of donation. This creates individual opportu-
nity not only to consent but also to object. The severity of the organ
shortage requires taking the risk of increased refusal. The lessons
learned from enactment of the 1987 UAGA will guide future attempts
at regulating this valuable and personal resource.
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